New York Times Editorial - Talking with Iraqi insurgents
New York Times Editorial - Talking with Iraqi insurgents
Copyright by The New York Times
Published: June 29, 2006
It is a measure of how far Washington has scaled down its expectations on Iraq that this week's most encouraging news consisted of some highly tentative feelers for direct talks between the armed Shiite parties that dominate Iraq's government and some of the armed Sunni insurgent groups that have been fighting it.
Don't get us wrong. We, too, are encouraged that Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki has announced a promising, though not fully spelled out, national reconciliation program aimed at attracting wider support from the restive Sunni Arab minority. We are even more encouraged that several Sunni insurgent groups have reportedly approached the government with the idea of beginning negotiations.
If these approaches lead to successful talks with important elements of the insurgency, it would be a crucial breakthrough. Productive negotiations could help transform the newly formed Maliki cabinet into a true government of national unity, not just a symbolic parceling out of cabinet jobs among Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni politicians.
An agreement with major insurgent groups would also be an important step toward eventually enabling the Iraqi government to stand on its own, without having to rely indefinitely on tens of thousands of American troops to hold down the Sunni western provinces. Such an agreement could stabilize some areas enough to allow the kind of infrastructure repair and economic reconstruction that could generate genuine support from ordinary Iraqis.
Nobody should underestimate the obstacles. But if Maliki is prepared to be a strong national leader, rather than a captive of the Shiite parties that put him in power, there is a chance that they can be overcome.
One big issue is amnesty. Insurgent groups are unlikely to agree to lay down their arms without some assurances of amnesty for their fighters. Yet the Iraqi government talks about denying amnesty to insurgents who have killed other Iraqis, and Washington has insisted on excluding those who have killed Americans. That is understandable on both counts, but it would seem to leave few, if any, real insurgents eligible for any amnesty.
There is also the question of dropping employment restrictions and other penalties against all but the highest echelons of former Baath Party members - those with direct responsibility for the major crimes of the Saddam Hussein era. For most of the rest, party membership was often a condition for employment, promotion and, in some cases, survival. But many Shiites and Kurds, who suffered systematic discrimination under Baath rule, want to penalize even lower-level Baathists.
Any reconciliation broad enough to matter will require embracing unsavory people and forgiving unsavory deeds. That won't be pretty or popular. But it is Iraq's best remaining hope for peace, reconstruction and national survival.
Copyright by The New York Times
Published: June 29, 2006
It is a measure of how far Washington has scaled down its expectations on Iraq that this week's most encouraging news consisted of some highly tentative feelers for direct talks between the armed Shiite parties that dominate Iraq's government and some of the armed Sunni insurgent groups that have been fighting it.
Don't get us wrong. We, too, are encouraged that Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki has announced a promising, though not fully spelled out, national reconciliation program aimed at attracting wider support from the restive Sunni Arab minority. We are even more encouraged that several Sunni insurgent groups have reportedly approached the government with the idea of beginning negotiations.
If these approaches lead to successful talks with important elements of the insurgency, it would be a crucial breakthrough. Productive negotiations could help transform the newly formed Maliki cabinet into a true government of national unity, not just a symbolic parceling out of cabinet jobs among Shiite, Kurdish and Sunni politicians.
An agreement with major insurgent groups would also be an important step toward eventually enabling the Iraqi government to stand on its own, without having to rely indefinitely on tens of thousands of American troops to hold down the Sunni western provinces. Such an agreement could stabilize some areas enough to allow the kind of infrastructure repair and economic reconstruction that could generate genuine support from ordinary Iraqis.
Nobody should underestimate the obstacles. But if Maliki is prepared to be a strong national leader, rather than a captive of the Shiite parties that put him in power, there is a chance that they can be overcome.
One big issue is amnesty. Insurgent groups are unlikely to agree to lay down their arms without some assurances of amnesty for their fighters. Yet the Iraqi government talks about denying amnesty to insurgents who have killed other Iraqis, and Washington has insisted on excluding those who have killed Americans. That is understandable on both counts, but it would seem to leave few, if any, real insurgents eligible for any amnesty.
There is also the question of dropping employment restrictions and other penalties against all but the highest echelons of former Baath Party members - those with direct responsibility for the major crimes of the Saddam Hussein era. For most of the rest, party membership was often a condition for employment, promotion and, in some cases, survival. But many Shiites and Kurds, who suffered systematic discrimination under Baath rule, want to penalize even lower-level Baathists.
Any reconciliation broad enough to matter will require embracing unsavory people and forgiving unsavory deeds. That won't be pretty or popular. But it is Iraq's best remaining hope for peace, reconstruction and national survival.
posted by Carlos T Mock at 8:09 AM
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