Financial Times Editorial Comment: History will judge who lost Iraq
Financial Times Editorial Comment: History will judge who lost Iraq
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2007
Published: August 21 2007 19:24 | Last updated: August 21 2007 19:24
It has been some time since the complacent official narrative about Britain’s involvement in Iraq has passed muster – not only with its sceptical citizens but also with its troops. Nearly a year ago, the British army’s chief of staff said the UK’s military presence in southern Iraq “exacerbates the security problems”. Now, officials and strategists in Washington have concluded that the British army has been defeated in southern Iraq and have started to express alarm that Gordon Brown will try to consolidate his new premiership by heading for the exit.
Britain’s political cover was always prized by the Bush administration but, as Donald Rumsfeld, the former defence secretary, made humil iatingly clear, its military contribution was considered optional. So what is the balance sheet?
To begin with, south Iraq was never Britain’s to lose. The Rumsfeld Pentagon’s incompetence probably lost Iraq in the anarchy triggered immediately after the fall of Baghdad. The southern provinces were spared that chaos, but only because the Shia clerical hierarchy led by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani compelled restraint. It held the ring until the political process – a new constitution and representative elections – delivered Iraq to its Shia majority. Unlike the Sunni centre and west, where Ba’athists, Sunni supremacists and jihadis launched a lethal insurgency against the Anglo-American occupation, the south was relatively quiescent. That deceptive calm has been torn to pieces by the intra-Shia jostle for power between three rival clerical dynasties and their armed allies.
The Sadr dynasty, now headed by the young radical Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi army, wants to be the Shia leadership of a united Iraq. The Hakim dynasty, with its Iran-trained, US-backed Badr militia, wants power in Baghdad but alongside an oil-rich Shia-stan in south Iraq. The Basra-based Fadhila (Virtue) party wants local hegemony but federal control of the oil ministry. This April, US troops took the field alongside Badr against Sadr. They, as well as the British, are now seen as just another militia.
British forces, of course, while trumpeting their “softly, softly” engagement of the locals, were relying heavily on local militias from the outset; the US took longer to reach that position. Both forces are now staring at defeat. The remaining question is how to organise withdrawal in the way least damaging to Iraq and in a way that might – just – compel Iraqi leaders to compromise instead of pursuing winner-takes-all policies. That is the urgent debate; the judgment of history will take care of who lost Iraq.
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2007
Published: August 21 2007 19:24 | Last updated: August 21 2007 19:24
It has been some time since the complacent official narrative about Britain’s involvement in Iraq has passed muster – not only with its sceptical citizens but also with its troops. Nearly a year ago, the British army’s chief of staff said the UK’s military presence in southern Iraq “exacerbates the security problems”. Now, officials and strategists in Washington have concluded that the British army has been defeated in southern Iraq and have started to express alarm that Gordon Brown will try to consolidate his new premiership by heading for the exit.
Britain’s political cover was always prized by the Bush administration but, as Donald Rumsfeld, the former defence secretary, made humil iatingly clear, its military contribution was considered optional. So what is the balance sheet?
To begin with, south Iraq was never Britain’s to lose. The Rumsfeld Pentagon’s incompetence probably lost Iraq in the anarchy triggered immediately after the fall of Baghdad. The southern provinces were spared that chaos, but only because the Shia clerical hierarchy led by Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani compelled restraint. It held the ring until the political process – a new constitution and representative elections – delivered Iraq to its Shia majority. Unlike the Sunni centre and west, where Ba’athists, Sunni supremacists and jihadis launched a lethal insurgency against the Anglo-American occupation, the south was relatively quiescent. That deceptive calm has been torn to pieces by the intra-Shia jostle for power between three rival clerical dynasties and their armed allies.
The Sadr dynasty, now headed by the young radical Moqtada al-Sadr and his Mahdi army, wants to be the Shia leadership of a united Iraq. The Hakim dynasty, with its Iran-trained, US-backed Badr militia, wants power in Baghdad but alongside an oil-rich Shia-stan in south Iraq. The Basra-based Fadhila (Virtue) party wants local hegemony but federal control of the oil ministry. This April, US troops took the field alongside Badr against Sadr. They, as well as the British, are now seen as just another militia.
British forces, of course, while trumpeting their “softly, softly” engagement of the locals, were relying heavily on local militias from the outset; the US took longer to reach that position. Both forces are now staring at defeat. The remaining question is how to organise withdrawal in the way least damaging to Iraq and in a way that might – just – compel Iraqi leaders to compromise instead of pursuing winner-takes-all policies. That is the urgent debate; the judgment of history will take care of who lost Iraq.
posted by Carlos T Mock at 9:34 AM
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